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# Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W
---------- 035432
P 271955 Z MAR 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1894

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 120

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS PARM
SUBJECT: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF MARCH 27 POST- MEETING DISCUSSIONS

REF: USDEL SALT TWO II 117

SUMMARY: THERE FOLLOWS A DETAILED ACCOUNT
OF THE MARCH 27 POST MEETING DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. MIRVS: BROWN ( NITZE/ BROWN WITH SHCHUKIN, A-164)
WENT THROUGH LIST OF WEAPONS PROHIBITED FROM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEPLOYMENT IN SEMENOV PROPOSAL AT FORMAL MEETING. HE ASKED
WHETHER MIRVS WERE ANOTHER EXAMPLE THAT MIGHT BE INCLUDED.
SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THE LIST WAS INTENDED AS A SET OF POSSIBLE
EXAMPLES, WHICH COULD BE ENLARGED BY ADDITION, AND
IMPLIED THAT THIS COULD INCLUDE MIRVS.

2. SHCHUKIN SAID MIRV CONTINUES TO BE DIFFICULT SUBJECT
BECAUSE OF SUCH QUESTIONS AS VERIFICATION. HE RAISED ISSUE
OF WHETHER U. S. AS WELL AS SOVIET UNION COULD NOT GAIN
BY TAKING OBLIGATIONS EVEN WHEN THESE WERE NOT CLOSELY
VERIFIABLE. SUCH OBLIGATIONS MIGHT NEVERTHELESS PROVE
EFFECTIVE. HE USED EXAMPLE OF THE PROHIBITION OF BOMBS
IN ORBIT WHICH NOT VERIFIABLE. BROWN AND NITZE
RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS QUITE A DIFFERENT SITUATION.
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3. SHCHUKIN SUGGESTED THAT A MIRV AGREEMENT MIGHT LIMIT EACH SIDE TO 300-500 MIRVED LAND- BASED MISSILES OF A PARTICULAR TYPE. HE ADDED THAT IF MIRVS WERE LIMITED IN NUMBER BY AGREEMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE SIDES WOULD NOT BE CERTAIN TO DISCOVER VIOLATIONS OF THESE LEVELS BY NATIONAL MEANS, THEY COULD NOT BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF GOING UNDISCOVERED IF THEY VIOLATED AGREEMENT. THIS SHOULD HAVE DETERRENT EFFECT AGAINST VIOLATION.

4. WHEN BROWN POINTED OUT THAT A TESTING LIMITATION WAS MUCH MORE VERIFIABLE, SHCHUKIN SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ONE SIDE TO HAVE MIRVS AND OTHER NOT TO HAVE ANY, OR FOR ONE SIDE TO BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP MIRVS FURTHER WHILE OTHER HAD NO LIMITATIONS. BROWN SUGGESTED THESE WERE NOT THE ONLY POSSIBILITIES. HE NOTED TESTING MIGHT BE ALLOWED FOR SOME BUT NOT FOR OTHER MISSILES. EVEN THIS WOULD LEAD TO SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT VERIFICATION, BUT WOULD BE VERIFIABLE TO A DEGREE. SHCHUKIN RESPONDED THAT HE HAD HEARD OF THIS " AMERICAN" ( SIC) PROPOSAL AT LAST GENEVA SESSION.

5. BOMBER AND BOMBER ARMAMENTS: SHCHUKIN ( TO NITZE/ BROWN, A-164) RAISED QUESTION OF OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON BOMBERS, SPECIFICALLY CITING AIR- TO- SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES AS AN EXAMPLE. HE CLAIMED, AND NITZE DENIED, THAT IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO DECIDE ON SOME RANGE FOR SUCH MISSILES WHICH SHOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED. SHCHUKIN MENTIONED A FEW HUNDRED, PERHAPS ONE THOUSAND KMS. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS ENOUGH RANGE TO AVOID INTERCEPTION BY SOVIET AIR DEFENSES.

6. NITZE AND BROWN REPEATED US ARGUMENT THAT BOMBER ARMAMENTS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION FROM AIR DEFENSES. SHCHUKIN DENIED THE ANALOGY WITH ABMS AND STRATEGIC MISSILES, INDICATING THAT SOVIET BOMBER DEFENSES WERE NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE AGAINST THIRD POWERS. LATER ON, SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOMBERS WOULD ALLOW CONTINUED USE OF US STRATEGIC BOMBERS IN A NON- NUCLEAR ROLE IN LIMITED WARS.

7. WHEN KLOSSON ( A-163) ASKED WHAT DISTANCE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY TALKED ABOUT " LONG- RANGE" AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES, GRINEVSKY REPLIED THIS QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AT NEGOTIATING TABLE SINCE, THE AGREED INTERPRETA-

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TIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE WAS NO

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AGREED FIGURE FOR WHAT CONSTITUTED LONG- RANGE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AS TO WHAT SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND WHEN IT REFERRED TO LONG- RANGE ASMS, PLESHAKOV ( TO GRAYBEAL/ IFFT/ FITZGERALD, A-161) INDICATED THAT PRESENT AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES ARE OKAY. SOVIET PROPOSAL APPLIES ONLY TO NEW ARMS. PLESHAKOV SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD A SPECIFIC LIMIT IN MIND BUT WERE NOT READY TO REVEAL IT YET. IF NECESSARY THEY COULD GIVE THEIR PROPOSED RANGE LIMIT.

9. US PARTICIPANTS POINTED OUT EXTREME NATURE OF SOVIET POSITION PROHIBITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AND QUESTIONED HOW SOVIET SIDE COULD RATIONALIZE THIS POSITION WITH PLESHAKOV' S EARLIER STATEMENT PERMITTING PRESENT AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES. PLESHAKOV DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, BUT STATED SOVIET BOMBER PROPOSAL WAS A FORM OF " REDUCTIONS." HE WENT ON TO STATE SOVIET AIR DEFENSES WERE FOR THIRD COUNTRIES AND NOT DIRECTED TOWARDS THE US. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

10. TRUSOV, BELETSKIY, USTINOV ( TO ROWNY, A-160) DELIVERED LONG REBUTTAL OF ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT THAT BOMBER ARMAMENTS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR LIMITATION WITHOUT CORRESPONDING CONSIDERATIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON AIR DEFENSES. THEY SAID ABM ANALOGY NOT A GOOD ONE, BECAUSE ABM SYSTEMS DESIGNED ONLY FOR DEFENSE AGA
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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W
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FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1895

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 120

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF MARCH 27 POST- MEETING DISCUSSIONS

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WITH THIRD COUNTRY ATTACK AND BROUGHT UP THE ARGUMENT OF U. S. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WITHIN NUCLEAR STRIKE RANGE OF USSR TERRITORY. ROWNY REPEATED ARGUMENT THAT MAINTENANCE OF PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF DETERRENT FORCES IS IMPORTANT FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WE SHOULD NOT GET INTO QUESTIONS OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC BALANCES BETWEEN EITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES AND THIRD COUNTRIES, OR BETWEEN ALLIANCES WE PARTICIPATE IN OR SUPPORT.

11. BREZHNEV VISIT: PLESHAKOV ( TO GRAYBEAL/ IFFT/ FITZGERALD, A-161) SAID HE HAD READ IN US PAPERS THAT BREZHNEV WOULD BE VISITING US IN JUNE.

12. IN EARLIER CONVERSATION ON MARCH 25, CAPT. MAZERKIN ( TO FITZGERLAD, A-160) OBSERVED THAT, JUDGING BY U. S. PRESS, SHULTZ' S VISIT TO MOSCOW HAD APPARENTLY RESULTED IN SOME USEFUL PROGRESS TOWARD VARIOUS ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE TRADE AGREEMENTS. HE WONDERED WHETHER FITZGERALD THOUGHT BREZHNEV' S JUNE VISIT MIGHT NOT RESULT IN SOME SERIOUS AGREEMENTS, THE PREPARATION FOR WHICH WOULD KEEP THE DELEGATIONS VERY BUSY IN GENEVA UNTIL AT LEAST THE END OF MAY.
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13. AGGERGATE/ REDUCTIONS: GRINEVSKY ( TO KLOSSON, A-163) INDICATED THAT SOV DEL AT FUTURE MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE ITS SURVEY OF ALL CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND WOULD PROPOSE EITHER LIMITATIONS -- FOLLOWING ITS FORMULA OF " AGREED LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES" -- OR PROHIBITION. GRINEVSKY SAID SOVIETS HAD CONCEPT OF AN AGGREGATE FIGURE TO COVER ALL CATEGORIES, BUT HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON WHERE THIS FIGURE STOOD IN RELATION TO CURRENT STRENGTH OF EITHER SIDE.

14. SHCHUKIN ( TO NITZE/ BROWN, A-164) ASKED ABOUT AGGREGATES. IN THE CASE OF ICBM NUMBERS, WAS IT US PROPOSAL THAT BOTH SIDES MUST HAVE SAME NUMBER OF MISSILES OR ONLY THAT BOTH SIDES MUST HAVE THE RIGHT ( NOT NECESSARILY THE INTENTION) TO HAVE AN EQUAL NUMBER? IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE POST- AGREEMENT DECISION BY THE U. S. NOT TO BUILD UP TO AN ALLOWED NUMBER, WHICH MIGHT THEN FORCE SOVIETS TO REDUCE THEIR NUMBER OF LAND- BASED MISSILES. NITZE AND BROWN ASSURED HIM THIS NOT THE MEANING OF US PROPOSAL. US PROPOSAL CALLED FOR EACH SIDE TO HAVE UP TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MISSILES PLUS BOMBERS IN AGGREGATE, UP TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF LAND- BASED MISSILES, AND UP TO A CERTAIN THROW- WEIGHT. THIS WAS A RIGHT WHICH MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE EXERCISED. AS TO WHETHER AGGREGATE WOULD BE SUCH AS TO REQUIRE REDUCTIONS, THAT WOULD BE NEGOTIATED BEFORE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT US

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POSITION HAD CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE AGGREGATE. NITZE AND BROWN, PER CURRENT US INSTRUCTIONS, AVOIDED THE ISSUE. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT TO DESTROY OLD ARTILLERY, LET ALONE RELATIVELY NEW MISSILES.

15. THROW- WEIGHT: WHEN GRAYBEAL/ IFFT/ FITZGERALD ( A-161) ASKED WHAT SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY SAID THAT OTHER THINGS WERE EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS THROW- WEIGHT IN CONSIDERING ICBM LIMITATIONS, PLESHAKOV POINTED TO THE BROWN- NITZE- SHCHUKIN CONVERSATION-- AN APPARENT ALLUSION TO MIRVS ( SEE PARA 2 ABOVE).

16. FREEDOM- TO- MIX: USTINOV ( TO ROWNY, A-166), IN DISCUSSING FREEDOM- TO- MIX, WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER U. S. ENVISIONED A UNIT- FOR- UNIT EXCHANGE OR A LAUNCHER- FOR- LAUNCHER

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ONE. HE SAID IF U. S. CONSIDERED A BOMBER TO BE A LAUNCHER, THEN A MISSILE SUBMARINE WOULD BE WORTH SIXTEEN BOMBERS. EXCHANGING BOMBERS AND SUBMARINES WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING OR REMOVING A PARTIAL SUBMARINE FROM THE INVENTORY. ROWNY CONFIRMED U. S. CONCEPT WAS LAUNCHER- FOR- LAUNCHER ONE, WITH A HEAVY BOMBER CONSIDERED TO BE A LAUNCHER. JOHNSON

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